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Digging down into property — The
downward extent of property: A New
Zealand Perspective
Mick Strack* and Julian Thom†
Subsurface property rights come into focus when transport and infrastructure
tunnels are required to service urban settlement. This article investigates the
vertical extent of property in this context. It discusses common law property
theory, examines relevant case law and shows how other jurisdictions have
legislated for subsurface uses. It explores what may legitimately be
considered private and what public, and where an appropriate boundary may
lie. It finds that, just as the upper airspace is considered open for public
navigation, free of any rights claimed by a surface proprietor, subsurface
space below the depth of reasonable use by a surface proprietor should also
be considered public space. This would facilitate the Crown’s ability to
develop underground space for transport and infrastructure without the need
to negotiate with and compensate surface property owners.
I Introduction
Subsurface property rights come into focus when transport and infrastructure
tunnels are required to service urban settlement. Public rights and needs for
communication and navigation have long been recognised in law and policy
as requiring priority consideration, but private property rights are strongly
protected by statutory and common law and convention. How might a
reasonable compromise between public and private property be achieved?
On the one hand, New Zealand law has long supported private property and
the rights associated with that property. The cadastral system which records
rights, responsibilities and restrictions in land is well supported by the state.
The economic system is powerfully dependent on the legal protections of
property in a free market. Investment choices are strongly influenced by
security of tenure and the freedoms and benefits provided by private property.
We have been enculturated into a belief that private property is inviolate, and
proprietors remain fiercely protective of their private property rights.
On the other hand, all land has a public character. Initially all property
rights derive from a grant from the Crown,1 so implicitly the Crown can
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determine what rights it is granting.2 Furthermore, property rights have never
been absolute, and with increasing urban density, declining environmental
quality, increased concerns for public amenity and welfare, the defence of the
freedoms of property is increasingly challengeable.3
This article examines the definitions of land and property; it questions the
legitimate extent of property rights; and it specifically questions whether that
long accepted brocard4 cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos
(whoever owns the land, also owns what is above and below)5 is relevant. The
purpose is to make a strong argument for the legitimate limits of private
property and the corresponding right of the Crown (the public) to access
subsurface space.
II The context of subsurface property concern
Urban growth and density increases, along with persistent calls for efficient
roading networks and public transport, have necessitated plans for tunnels
under many cities. In Auckland, the recent motorway tunnel project,
Waterview Tunnel connecting State Highway 16 and 20, has required the
acquisition of subsurface private property for a public road. The acquisition
required extensive and complicated 3-dimensional surveys defining a maze of
subsurface property interests,6 and extensive and expensive negotiations for
property takings and payments of compensation.
This has inevitably raised the question: what is the extent of subsurface
rights?
III The vertical extent of property rights
The legal property regime in New Zealand is based on the doctrine of tenure7
whereby all land is ultimately held by the Crown; interests (or estates) can be
2 For example, in the case Mueller v Taupiri Coal Mines Ltd (1900) 20 NZLR 89 it was
determined that because the Waikato River was of such importance to the Crown as a
military highway, that the title to half the river (ad medium filum) was not part of the grant
of the adjoining land.
3 See Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, ‘The Idea of Property in Land’ in Susan Bright and
John Dewar (eds), Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 1998) 15.
4 A brocard is a maxim expressing an aspect of the law in Latin. The cuius est solum concept
is also regularly referred to as a maxim or a doctrine of the common law; however, those
terms suggest legal validity that we wish to avoid or at least interrogate.
5 The translation is ‘whosever the soil is, it is theirs all the way to the heavens and all the way
to hell’ or in a more applied version: the owner of the land owns everything up to the sky
and down to the centre of the earth; or even more simply, ownership includes everything
above and below the surface. It is an elegant but simplistic concept and has obvious physical
and practical shortcomings.
6 Rick Galli, the Land Acquisition Programme Manager for City Rail Link Ltd, explained that
designing the geometry of cadastral boundaries was an extremely complex process. It
involves merging the visuals of engineering designs, legislative requirements, geological
models and future uses, to ‘engineer’ the vertical boundaries to a high level of precision.
The complexity of the boundaries is then ‘deconstructed’ so people can understand the
encumbrances on their properties.
7 Note that the Law Commission describes this as a legal fiction that could have been
abandoned, but that recommendation was not actioned by the government. Law
Commission, Tenure and Estates in Land (Preliminary Paper No 20, 7 June 1992).
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granted by the Crown in the form of a fee simple title which is usually
understood to represent the highest (and most secure) form of title available.
A fee simple title implies a full set of property rights8 but one thatremains
regulated by planning law intervention. Such a title needs to be clearly and
unambiguously spatially defined — usually by the placing of pegs in the
ground.9 Traditionally, land as property has been defined in two dimensions (a
horizontal plane),10 and there has not been a specific need to consider any third
dimension (vertical height or depth) limits to property.11 Of course, actual
occupation and possession is not two-dimensional. Vertical space is required
to occupy the earth’s surface and specifically for legitimate construction above
and below the surface. New technology now allows us to build higher12 and
reach deeper13 than ever before, so the vertical limits are constantly changing.
However, there must, at some point, be practical limits to our reach, and in any
event, such extremes are far from the normal private property requirements for
surface proprietors.
The third (vertical) dimension is often referenced back to the Latin brocard
cuius est solum. The origin of this concept is unclear14 but the judicial history
is concisely and well explained by Lord Hope in the UK Supreme Court case
Star Energy Weald Basin Ltd v Bocardo SA (‘Star Energy’).15 In any event, the
concept is not of such unquestioned antiquity to suggest it is free from
challenge. There have been numerous cases where intrusions into the airspace
above a land parcel have been challenged, and the courts have frequently
8 These include the rights to buy and sell, to use and enjoy, to control, to hold exclusively and
to take any profit from.
9 See Mick Strack, ‘Draw Conclusions on the Wall: Defence of the Monumented Cadastre’
(2017) 26(1) Australian Property Law Journal 1, 7–8.
10 See Julian Thom and Mick Strack, ‘The Multiple and Conflicting Definitions of Land’
(2017) 92 Surveying+Spatial 7, 7.
11 The establishment of the Unit Titles Act 1972 (NZ), which came into force in 1973 (later
replaced by the Unit Titles Act 2010), required the vertical dimension to be shown for strata
property.
12 In fact, vertical airspace is becoming a very valuable commodity in densely occupied urban
spaces, as high-rise buildings compete for higher uses. In New Zealand, when the Unit
Titles Act (n 11) was first conceived, developers created unit titles for airspace (no building)
in Queenstown to capitalise on its value. Doing so created legal arrangements that could not
be practically developed. The Unit Titles Act 2010 now requires that a Principal Unit
‘contains a building or part of a building or is contained in a building (although the unit may
or may not be bounded by the physical dimensions of the building)’ (s 7). Similarly, there
may be an economic motive in the future to acquire subsurface rights in areas earmarked
for public transportation projects, although how title to separate subsurface spaces could be
provided for or recorded is uncertain.
13 New drilling technology can reach kilometres underground in search of extractable
resources like oil and gas.
14 It is often traced back to the 13th century scholar Accursius. Jonathan Law (ed), A
Dictionary of Law (Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 2015), ‘cuius est solum, eius est usque
ad coelum et ad inferos’.
15 Star Energy Weald Basin Ltd v Bocardo SA [2010] UKSC 35 (‘Star Energy’).
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decided in favour of such intrusions being acts of trespass upon the surface
owner’s rights. However, with the advent of air travel it was more or less
immediately recognised that higher altitude overflight by aircraft could not
cause an actionable trespass, and most countries instituted aviation legislation
which confirmed the freedom of the airspace as public navigable highways,
not subject to surface owner’s rights.16
In United States v Causby (‘Causby’)17 Douglas J said that the doctrine
expressed in the brocard has no place in the modern world:
The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true, every
transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits.
Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognise such private claims to the airspace
would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control and development
in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only the
public has a just claim.18
Similarly in England, in Bernstein of Leigh (Baron) v Skyviews & General Ltd
(‘Bernstein’),19 while a low-level flight over a property for the purpose of
photographing the property was accepted as a trespass, Griffith J stated that
wholly different considerations arise when considering the passage of aircraft
at a height which in no way affects the user of the land. He considered that
the balance was best struck by restricting the rights of the owner to such height as
necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of his land and the structures upon it,
and declaring that above that height he has no greater rights in the air space than any
other member of the public.20
Many other US cases can be cited to support the restricted upper limit on
property. For example:
We own so much of the space above the ground as we can occupy or make use of,
in connection with the enjoyment of our land. This right is not fixed. It varies with
our varying needs and is coextensive with them. The owner of land owns as much
16 For example, in New Zealand; the Civil Aviation Act 1990 s 97(2) ‘No action shall lie in
respect of trespass, or in respect of nuisance, by reason only of the flight of aircraft over any
property at a height above the ground which having regard to wind, weather, and all the
circumstances of the case is reasonable’.
17 United States v Causby, 328 US 256 (1946) (‘Causby’).
18 Ibid 261–2 (emphasis added). The emphasis was added to the words ‘The air is a public
highway’ for two reasons. First, presumably when air was referred to, what was meant was
the airspace. Second, this argument could be legitimately used for the subsurface: private
rights in the subsurface could interfere with the development of the subsurface space the
public has a claim to.
19 Bernstein of Leigh (Baron) v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479 (‘Bernstein’).
20 Star Energy (n 15) [20] (Lord Hope) (emphasis added), citing Bernstein (n 19) 485.
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of the space above him as he uses, but only so long as he uses it. All that lies beyond
belongs to the world.21
It has been well argued, therefore, that surface proprietors should not have
exclusionary rights22 to the open airspace and, further, that the higher airspace
should not be included within the property of the surface proprietor. The
limiting height may either be that which allows reasonable use and possession
of the airspace above the land or the height that aircraft may reasonably
overfly the land (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Allocation of vertical property
A: The reasonable limits of vertical property — restricting the extent of ownership.
B: The vertical extent of property — cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos.
21 Hinman v Pacific Air Transport, 84 F 2d 755 (1936). It is, however, far from clear whether
that final sentence would stand further scrutiny.
22 See, eg, Gray and Gray (n 3) 19: ‘Many common law jurisdictions have, accordingly, seen
a move away from an “arbitrary exclusion rule” towards a “reasonable access rule” under
which the estate owners of quasi-public premises may exclude members of the public only
on grounds which are objectively reasonable. ... In a crowded urban environment, where
recreational, associational and expressional space is increasingly at a premium, an
unanalysed, monolithic privilege of arbitrary exclusion is no longer tenable.’
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IV Subsurface property
Our question then turns to the subsurface space: those spaces that might be
used for building foundations, bunkers, tunnels, reservoirs, mines and
infrastructure pipelines. These might all require a consideration of the nature
and extent of private property.
In the past — when New Zealand was being opened up for development —
railway and road tunnels were often built under private property without any
reference to the surface proprietor’s rights.23 This situation continues to exist
without any apparent conflict. However, recent tunnels built in Auckland, such
as the Waterview Tunnel in the west of the city, have required very complex
survey plans showing the three-dimensional space in the subsurface zones,
illustrated on two-dimensional plans, long-sections and cross-sections24 which
are largely unintelligible to a lay proprietor.25
For the public, the problems with interpretation mean that survey plans are
inaccessible and serve little useful purpose — the survey leaves behind a
complicated and unsatisfactory spatial definition of their land and legal
arrangements. Furthermore, the expense of compensation seems unjustified
when the surface title-holders appear largely unaffected by the tunnels under
the surface.26 For the roading authority, the freedom to manage their
23 Julian Thom, ‘Beyond Effective Control: The Extent of Subsurface Ownership’
(Professional Surveying Project, University of Otago, 2016).
24 The specific set of plans of the Waterview Tunnel (SO 434446) consist of 196 sheets. Even
Land Information New Zealand recognises the difficulties of depicting relatively simple
unit titles in three dimensions. ‘[U]nlike “2D” cadastral survey datasets (i.e., those which
do not contain height information), the detailed survey information (often both horizontal
and vertical) is not spatially captured in the Landonline system. Rather it is drafted on a
plan, with section and elevation graphics supported by textual descriptions. Height data
(e.g., a reduced level) is included on the plan but is also not captured. These plans can be
difficult to interpret, especially where the boundaries are not uniform.’ Trent Gulliver,
Anselm Haanen and Mark Goodin, ‘A 3D Digital Cadastre for New Zealand by 2021:
Leveraging the Current System and Modern Technology’ (Conference Paper,International
Workshop on 3D Cadastres, 18–20 October 2016) 473, 476.
25 Three-dimensional visualisation may provide a more accessible way of informing land
owners. As Shojaei et al recognise, ‘understanding these rights and making effective
decisions and analyses can be difficult without having experience in the art of reading and
interpreting plan information’. Davood Shojaei et al, ‘Design and Development of a 3D
Digital Cadastre Visualization Prototype’ (2018) 7(10) International Journal of
Geo-Information 384, abstract.
26 A study in the USA found that deep underground uses of land do not diminish the value of
the properties affected; see Max J Derbes Jr, ‘The Appraisal of Underground Easements’
(October 1992) Right of Way 16.
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infrastructure is important, but the complicated spatial depiction is of less
particular concern. Arguably, a roading authority could have been granted
management jurisdiction irrespective of title.27 For the cadastral system, which
expects clear and unambiguous spatial depiction of all property rights,28 the
calculated definition is provided, but boundaries usually only become
boundaries when they are marked on the ground, and these graphical spaces
have no physical or observable presence.29
The implication of these plans is that property rights of surface proprietors
have been partly extinguished30 to some subsurface space for the purposes of
a public highway.31 Furthermore, these plans show that the surface owners’
property continues in the deeper subsurface space even though it may have
been physically separated from the surface by the tunnel (Figure 2). The
implication of such surveys is that the brocard cuius est solum is applied as if
it is an unquestioned component of property law32 and the newly created
fragmented parcels acquire additional statutory protection33 of an indefeasible
land transfer title to the centre of the earth.34
27 This would be in much the same way as river control authorities (now regional councils)
have authority to undertake flood control works in rivers irrespective of legal title to the
rivers. The management issues for roads and rivers coalesced in the river control case
Kingdon v Hutt River Board [1904] 25 NZLR 145, which quoted from the English case The
Mayor etc of Tunbridge Wells v Baird [1896] AC 434 about roading authority (at 442):
‘[V]esting a street in an urban authority only vested such property in the soil of the street
as was necessary for the control, protection, and maintenance of the street as a highway for
public use.’ In other words, the adjoining or underlying property was retained, but subject
to the roading authority being able to carry out its public functions.
28 In New Zealand, this usually requires a fully dimensioned Cadastral Survey Dataset, known
as a ‘CSD’, and sufficient ground monumentation to clearly identify boundaries.
29 An alternative and much more appropriate and practical definition and title could be based
on occupation of the constructed tunnel, which has a clearly observed physical extent.
30 Compensation has been paid for the loss of property rights.
31 The detail of the survey further complicates the arrangements. The plans show a space of
land immediately below the surface as unencumbered property; below that is a space
recording a restrictive covenant (restricting any excavation), then a stratum separation strip
has been created between the private property space above and the road space below.
Presumably this is to ensure that the surface parcel does not have vertical road ‘frontage’
to the upper level space below, shown as ‘vested as road’. The space below the road is again
shown as unencumbered property with no lower limit shown. However, no such separation
strip has been created below the road, between it and the deeper subsurface land parcel. So
the legal title does have frontage to the lower level of the road space. See Figure 2.
32 It is not normal for common law rights, such as these deep subsurface rights, to be shown
in the survey system, which only records statutory interests. Neither the vertical limit nor
reference to the brocard is acknowledged on records of title in the description of parcels,
except in the case of unit titles. And, by way of analogy, riparian rights and common law
ownership to the centre of rivers are not shown on survey plans: ‘such an interest should not
be converted to the full and indefeasible title indicated by a certificate of title’. See Attorney
General & Hutt River Board v Leighton [1955] NZLR 750, 777 (Stanton J).
33 It might be anticipated that, in the future, if additional tunnels are required beneath the
existing one, a whole new round of statutory acquisitions would need to be negotiated with
surface owners.
34 The Crown could have taken the opportunity then to extinguish that deeper subsurface title,
either to claim it as Crown stratum or as land not subject to any ownership (res communis)
as was provided for the foreshore and seabed by s 11(2) of the Marine and Coastal Area
(Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (NZ): ‘Neither the Crown nor any other person owns, or is
capable of owning, the common marine and coastal area ...’.
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Figure 2. Diagram of the property divisions of the Waterview Tunnel, west
Auckland
A: The private property as defined in the surface title.
AA: The airspace belonging to property A, beginning at the surface and extending
ad coelum.
AB: The subsurface space immediately adjacent to the surface, including a lower
space encumbered by a restrictive covenant.
AC: Title held with the surface property A but as a severed parcel (not contiguous).
LEGAL ROAD: Area of road encompassing the excavated road tunnel and
associated infrastructure.
SEGREGATION STRIP: Area isolating the private property A from the legal road.
Note: The subterranean property (AC) could have been claimed by the Crown
without any calls for compensation.
The issue about subsurface rights has come before many common law
jurisdiction courts (including in the USA, Canada, Australia and England),
with some wide scope and some conflicting decisions. Significant subsurface
rights cases have involved tunnels, caves,35 mines, and pipelines. The Star
Energy case in England provided an opportunity for a high-level court, UK
Supreme Court, to examine the extent of subsurface rights. In this case an oil
company, working from their own land, drilled some diagonal wells to
considerable depths36 into the apex of an oil reservoir under neighbouring
land. The neighbour was totally unaffected by and initially unaware of the
35 See the Great Onyx Cave Case in the USA: Edwards v Sims, 24 SW (2d) 619 (1929).
36 The shallowest well entered the neighbouring property at a depth of 800 ft (244 m).
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wells37 intruding under their land. It was common ground that the oil being
extracted was not owned by any surface owner but was extracted by Star
Energy under licence from the Crown. After examining relevant precedent and
noting that many cases had decided that the brocard cuius est solum was not
applicable to deep subsurface rights, Lord Hope found that the wells were a
trespass on the surface title — specifically, that even if the limits of property
did not extend to the centre of the earth and property was limited by the extent
of practical use, these wells were ‘far from being so deep as to reach the point
of absurdity’.38 There was, however, a split decision about what damages such
trespass occasioned. In contrast, other cases have not been so accepting of the
concept. Lord Wilberforce in a Privy Council case from Australia, after
examining several other similar cases, stated:
In none of these cases is there any authoritative pronouncement that ‘land’ means the
whole of the space from the centre of the earth to the heavens; so sweeping,
unscientific and unpractical a doctrine is unlikely to appeal to the common law
mind39
Lord Hope in Star Energy acknowledged Lord Wilberforce’s doubts about the
concept cuius est solum but explained that the brocard, while not being part of
English common law on the basis of an ancient decree, is incorporated into
English law by being adopted by court decisions.40
American cases have largely reached the alternative decision aligning with
Lord Wilberforce. Along with the Causby case referred to above, several other
cases have put a vertical limit on property, and just as the rights to the airspace
above land have been limited to the extent to which the owner may reasonably
make use of it, ‘[b]y analogy, the title of an owner of the soil will not be
extended to a depth below ground beyond which the owner may not
reasonably make use thereof’.41 Similarly, in Chance v BP Chemicals Inc,42
the judge extended the restricted airspace decisions to subsurface rights:
We therefore extend the reasoning of Willoughby Hills, that absolute ownership of
air rights is a doctrine which ‘has no place in the modern world,’ to apply as well
to ownership of subsurface rights.43
37 Indeed, the neighbour was also unaware of the existence of a valuable oil reservoir under
the land.
38 Star Energy (n 15) [27]. Lord Hope continued: ‘Indeed the fact that the strata can be worked
upon at those depths’ proves that it is within a surface owner’s title.
39 Commissioner for Railways v Valuer-General [1974] AC 325, 351.
40 Star Energy (n 15) [26].
41 Boehringer v Montalto, 142 Misc 560 (NY Sup Ct, 1931).
42 Chance v BP Chemicals Inc, 670 NE2d 985 (Ohio, 1996). This case was about a BP refinery
injecting hazardous waste deep into substrata and a concern of neighbouring properties that
there was lateral migration across deep subsurface boundaries, and therefore a violation of
their property rights.
43 Ibid, citing Willoughby Hills v Corrigan, 278 NE2d 658, 664 (Ohio, 1972). This case was
about an airport authority regulating land use heights in the airport approach zones. It
confirmed the Causby (n 17) decision that ‘the doctrine of the common law, that the
ownership of land extends to the periphery of the universe, has no place in the modern
world’.
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It would seem that there has been no clear or high-level decision in New
Zealand courts confirming or denying the extent of subsurface property rights.
It is therefore at least questionable what New Zealand law would say if
challenged in this respect.44
V Property in things or in space
An alternative way of approaching the question of subsurface rights is from
the perspective not of the surface owner, but that of unallocated, unclaimed or
unoccupied territory. If the subsurface space is not included in the title of the
surface owner and it is, by definition, within the territorial jurisdiction of the
state, then it may be unallocated Crown land, res nullius (nobody’s thing,
ie ownerless property) or res communis45 (a communal thing, ie public
property) — in other words, is it nobody’s or everybody’s?46 The concept of
terra nullius was about finding land without any obvious occupier47 and
therefore open to claim by the first discoverer, or perhaps the first to bring it
into their possession. The assertion of Crown sovereignty, which supposedly
provided for dominion over all land within a territory, might suggest that the
Crown could decide what was included in a Crown grant. In the early days of
settlement of Australia and New Zealand there was little thought about the
vertical extent of land; the practically and theoretically obscure cuius est
solum brocard was not on the minds of legislators. Definitions of land were
usually based on what was on the land, not what was above or below.48
It is worth noting that most case law about property above the surface is
about the space — all that is there is air; while most case law about subsurface
rights is about the things in that space, primarily the minerals. Similarly, the
legislation covering subsurface rights is normally about ownership of
minerals, not the space.49 Of course we can freely pass through the air, just as
44 However, the Australian Privy Council case Commissioner for Railways v Valuer-General
(n 39) provides the most direct precedent.
45 A conventional view of res communis refers to air, running water and the sea. Air and water
are the basic necessities of life, and those things provide the space — airspace, waterways
and the open ocean — for the freedom of navigation.
46 These concepts are interestingly discussed in the context of space law in Louise de Gouyon
Matignon, ‘The Res Communis Concept in Space Law’, Space Legal Issues (online,
28 February 2019) <https://www.spacelegalissues.com/space-law-the-res-communis-concept-
in-space-law/>. Also Jill Morgan asks: ‘Should subterranean space below a certain depth be
regarded as res omnium communis (the property of everyone) or res nullius (the property of
no-one) — both concepts allowing, initially at least, for full exploitation of subterranean
space — or should it belong to the state (or the Crown) as custodian of a resource which
can be used for the common good?’. Jill Morgan, ‘Digging Deep: Property Rights in
Subterranean Space and the Challenge of Carbon Capture and Storage’, (2013) 62(4)
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 813, 815.
47 This concept was applied to the colonisation of Australia on the basis that the Aboriginal
occupiers were without any settled system of law and lived in an uncivilised and primitive
state, and therefore the territory was freely available for British sovereignty and the land
freely available for settlement. Its application to Australia was overturned by the High Court
in a series of native title decisions (especially Mabo [No 2] [1992] HCA 23).
48 See Thom and Strack (n 10).
49 See Crown Minerals Act 1991 (NZ), but also the Public Works Act 1981 (NZ) s 31 which
refers to the ‘surface, subsoil, or airspace’ (emphasis added). Conceptual consistency would
have been achieved if it had referred to subsurface space instead of ‘subsoil’.
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we can almost as freely pass through water, so those spaces have been seen to
be open to public navigation. However, we cannot easily pass through
subsurface space until that space has been cleared of the minerals, either by
human agency or by natural causes. There have been no strong attempts to
argue that the subsurface space should be similarly available for public
navigation. Most of the recent literature about subsurface rights has been
focused on minerals and their extraction.50 However, as technology and needs
change, other discussions arise. The efforts now being made for carbon
sequestration in deep subterranean spaces is opening new themes. Carbon
capture and storage requires use of the pore space below the surface.51
VI Navigation as a public right
The rights of the public to freedom of the seas for innocent passage has long
been held to deny private property in the sea and the seabed.52 Similarly,
navigable rivers have assumed a similar status as public space that can rebut
the presumption of ad medium filum private title to navigable rivers.53 The
case Mueller v Taupiri Coal Mines54 confirmed the Crown’s prerogative to
withhold the bed of a navigable river from a Crown grant. The Coal Mines
Act 1903 (NZ)55 further defined the bed of a navigable river as being vested
in the Crown.56 Clearly the public interest in the freedom of navigation takes
priority over private property claims.
50 Also much of the literature about the scope of vertical property refers to the ‘airspace’
above, but the ‘soil’ below — apparently disregarding the difference between the space and
the contents of the space. See, eg, Adrian J Bradbook, ‘The Relevance of the Cujus Est
Solum Doctrine to the Surface Landowner’s Claims to Natural Resources Located Above
and Beneath the Land’ (1988) 11 Adelaide Law Review 462, 462: ‘the maxim means that the
owner of the land surface owns both the airspace above the surface stretching to the limits
of the atmosphere and the soil beneath the surface down to the centre of the earth’ (emphasis
added).
51 See Morgan (n 46).
52 Evidence of the priority given to public navigation can be found in, for example, old English
common law presumptions of Crown ownership of the sea for the purpose of navigation,
and in international instruments such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force
16 November 1994).
53 See Mick Strack, ‘Natural Boundaries, Legal Definitions: Making Room for Rivers’ in
Mick Strack et al (eds), Riverscapes: Research Essays on the Social Context of Southern
Catchments of Aotearoa New Zealand (Catchments Otago, 2018) 65. Even for
non-navigable rivers, if private title exists in the riverbed, the space above the riverbed is
still subject to the public’s fishing and navigation rights: see Kevin Guerin, ‘Property Rights
and Environmental Policy: A New Zealand Perspective’ (Treasury (NZ) Working Paper
No 03/02, 1 March 2003). This arrangement illustrates that private river ownership is not
a barrier to navigation, and public rights of navigation trump the private title.
54 Mueller v Taupiri Coal Mines (1900) 20 NZLR 89.
55 Section 14(1): ‘Save where the bed of a navigable river is or has been granted by the Crown,
the bed of such river shall remain and shall be deemed to have always been vested in the
Crown, and, without limiting in any way the rights of the Crown hereto, all minerals
including coal within such bed shall be the absolute property of the Crown.’
56 Note that in 1955, in Attorney General, Hutt River Board v Leighton (n 32), Fair J
considered the Coal Mines Act 1903 (NZ) to be confiscatory in its effect, as if the river had
been part of the private title and was taken by the Act. Other judges considered this
provision to be merely declaratory of the fact that navigable rivers were always public.
Digging down into property 11
As mentioned above, there is no general objection to the status of the upper
stratum of airspace being public and allowing for the freedom of navigation
by over-flight.57 There is also no serious argument that it is merely the
exclusive use rights that have been taken from the surface owner. When no
reasonable use can be made of the higher air space, then no claim to any
property rights could be successful.
With the foregoing in mind, it seems reasonable to assert and accept that the
deeper subsurface space (beyond reasonable use) is no logical part of any
surface property rights, and that it should be considered public or, at least, that
allowing public navigation should trump any private property rights. This is
not to say that public use of subsurface space will have no effect on surface
occupants. Aircraft overflight may be a nuisance and may even be hazardous
to the surface occupants; public passage along navigable waterways may seem
to be an invasion of privacy; rumblings or vibrations of vehicles or trains
under land may cause concern, but those issues can be dealt with by the law
of torts (nuisance, negligence, trespass) not by property law.58
VII Boundaries
The general principle about boundary law is that boundaries should be clearly
marked and identifiable on the ground such that proprietors have no doubt
about where their boundaries lie and may plainly observe when they are being
encroached upon.59 Licensed Cadastral Surveyors mark the position of
boundaries on the ground and prepare a plan that represents the survey and the
surveyor’s intention. The measurements on the plan can be used to confirm the
reliability of old boundary pegs and to reproduce the positions of the original
boundary pegs if they are lost or destroyed, but the originally placed pegs in
the ground are the controlling factor.60
This principle works well for marking the horizontal extent of property but
is not so straightforward when observing strata boundaries.61 Most vertical
boundaries only exist as lines on paper and are not marked on the ground.
Strata titles are now common in New Zealand — administered under the Unit
Titles Act 2010. These titles require a plan defining the horizontal extent of
each principal unit and accessory unit62 and an elevation showing a site datum
and the heights of each vertical layer, including an upper and lower limit. The
57 See Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252.
58 That is, these issues can be dealt with just like any annoyance caused by people living in
close proximity and behaving inconsiderately.
59 The point about boundaries being clearly marked was emphasised in an important recent
New Zealand case about the bank of a river as a boundary. In Canterbury Regional
Council v Dewhirst [2019] NZCA 486, the Court of Appeal confirmed that a river bank
boundary is not to be determined by any hydrological data or measurement, but by the
observable physical banks. See Mick Strack, ‘Where Are the Banks of a River? Property
and the Extent of Rivers’ (2021) 27 Journal of Water Law 2.
60 See Strack, ‘Draw Conclusions on the Wall’ (n 9).
61 See Gulliver, Haanen and Goodin(n 24).
62 Unit Titles Act 2010 (NZ) s 5: ‘unit, in relation to any land, means a part of the land
consisting of a space of any shape situated below, on, or above the surface of the land, or
partly in one such situation and partly in another or others, all the dimensions of which are
limited, and that is designed for separate ownership.’
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levels provide a convenient graphical aid, but the vertical boundaries are
actually defined by the permanent structure boundary, which ‘does not
necessarily follow the physical shape of the permanent structure but must have
some description that unambiguously relates the boundary to the permanent
structure’.63 The space adjacent to the units (both horizontally and vertically)
is common property, and that has no documented upper or lower limit.
The identification of subterranean vertical boundaries is similarly
contentious. Alongside other objections to subsurface property, the problem of
boundary marking provides an argument that deep subsurface boundaries are
meaningless. Three-dimensional visualisation technology has the potential to
provide better understanding about how subsurface spaces relate to each other
and to the surface.64 However, the problem remains that subsurface boundaries
cannot be marked on the ground unless they are within an accessible void (like
a tunnel or cave).
Another way that vertical space can be separated from the surface is by the
Crown claiming a Crown stratum.65 This has happened in several situations
when the Crown has vested some lakebeds in an iwi (tribe), but retained all the
space above the bed.66 This Crown stratum remains undefined except in the
sense that it is a balance parcel of Crown land left over from the vertical
subdivision of the lake. The concept of a Crown stratum could be usefully
employed for subsurface space also. It effectively creates a res communis.
Once all the things (the minerals) in the subsurface have been reserved for the
Crown, any arguments against excluding the subsurface space from the
property lose much impact.
Under the common law, it is apparently possible to subdivide a parcel of
land both vertically and horizontally. But in New Zealand, at least, even if the
Land Transfer Act 2017 (NZ) could allow a strata title of a properly surveyed
three-dimensional parcel to be registered, planning legislation has not
provided for a strata subdivision outside of the Unit Titles Act 2010.67 It is,
however, common for a memorial on a record of title to record a spatially
63 ‘Permanent Structure Boundaries’, Land Information New Zealand (Web Page)
<https://www.linz.govt.nz/kb/775>. This may best be provided by a horizontal or vertical
offset measurement from the structure.
64 See Shojaei et al (n 25).
65 Mick Strack and Nick Davies, ‘A Fee Simple Stratum Title to a Lake — Does It Make
Sense?’ (2017) 91 Surveying+Spatial 19. ‘Crown stratum’ means the space occupied by
water and the space occupied by air above each Te Arawa lakebed.
66 See, eg, Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006 (NZ). In this case the iwi is a formally
constituted Māori tribal trust — the Te Arawa Lakes Trust.
67 It has sometimes been suggested that some vertical element of a title could be alienated
separately from the main (eg a proprietor selling subsurface rights while retaining the
surface rights), but it is difficult to see how this could be legalised within our land planning
and cadastral systems. In the case Ruapekapeka Sawmill Co Ltd v Yeatts [1958] NZLR 265,
a second-storey flat had been conferred by deed on Mrs Yeatts as a determinable life estate.
Haslam J stated (at 271): ‘There appears to be no legal reason why the grantee could not,
in such circumstances, obtain a certificate of title pursuant to ss. 91 to 95 of the Land
Transfer Act, or why an adequate survey plan could not be deposited under s. 167.’
However, even if such a strata subdivision could be registered under the then Land Transfer
Act 1952 (NZ), it was not possible under the district schemes prepared under the Town and
Country Planning Act 1953 (NZ) which were required to regulate and consent to all
subdivisions of land.
Digging down into property 13
unspecified encumbrance,68 but a separate title for subsurface space has no
support.69
VIII International statutory intervention
The brocard cuius est solum is referenced to some degree within most
common law and civil code jurisdictions. However, for reasons similar to why
this article questions its relevance — increasing demands for subsurface space
for communications and infrastructure; increasing urban property values
which is ramping up demands for compensation; and trying to bring some
balance between private rights and public rights — some countries have
implemented statutory changes. Lessons from other jurisdictions may be
useful to point us in new directions.
As mentioned above, legislation asserting ownership of subterranean
minerals is common. In New Zealand, for example, the Crown Minerals
Act 1991 states that all petroleum, gold, silver, and uranium shall be the
property of the Crown, and for land alienated from the Crown since 1991
every other mineral is reserved in favour of the Crown.70 This Act says nothing
about who owns the spaces occupied by those minerals.
In the Canadian province of Alberta, however, the Mines and Minerals
Act,71 while generally excluding gold and silver from a property grant, also
states: ‘The pore space below the surface of all land in Alberta is vested in and
is the property of the Crown in right of Alberta’.72 The pore space includes
subsurface reservoirs and caverns from where minerals have been extracted.
In the Australian state of Victoria, the Land Act 1958 states that any land
alienated from the Crown (in other words a fee simple title) is granted ‘only
down to such depth below the surface as the Governor in Council may by any
order direct’.73 Then, in regard to extracting minerals, another section states
that any mining operation does not affect or intrude upon surface property and
no compensation can be claimed for any damage, ‘provided that such mining
be carried on at a distance below the surface of such land of not less than
15 metres’.74 This does not exactly state that property ends at 15 m below the
surface, but at least ownership does have a downward limit.
In Singapore, the State Lands Act of 199675 states in s 3B:
(1) To avoid doubt, it is declared that for all purposes, any land includes only so
68 An example of a spatially unspecified encumbrance is being subject to s 11 of the Crown
Minerals Act 1991 (NZ) (which excludes all minerals from the title) or being subject to
pt IV of the Conservation Act 1987 (NZ) (which excludes any watercourses and marginal
strips). Similarly it is possible for a fee simple title to be issued for ‘Minerals Only’, but this
says nothing about ownership of the subsurface space.
69 The Waterview Tunnel survey was effectively a vertical subdivision, but no new titles were
created; part of the titles were taken and vested in the Crown — the Crown does not need
a title document for this process.
70 Crown Minerals Act 1991 (NZ) ss 10 and 11 — except for pounamu which is vested in Ngāi
Tahu.
71 Mines and Minerals Act, RSA 2000, c M-17.
72 Ibid s 15.1(1)(b).
73 Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 339(1).
74 Ibid s 337.
75 State Lands Act (Singapore, cap 314, 1996, 2015 rev ed).
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much of the subterranean space as is reasonably necessary for the use and
enjoyment of the land, being —
(a) such depth of subterranean space as is specified in the State title for that
land; or
(b) if no such depth is specified, subterranean space to -30.000 metres from
the Singapore Height Datum.
This statute provides the most compelling intervention and starkest contrast to
the standard expectation of the common law position because it explicitly
specifies a vertical limit for real property in the subsurface.
In Malaysia, the National Land Code 1965 s 44 defines the entitlement to
land as providing for ‘the exclusive use and enjoyment of so much of the
column of airspace above the surface of the land, and so much of the land
below that surface, as is reasonably necessary to the lawful use and enjoyment
of the land’.76
In Japan, the Act on Special Measures Concerning Public Use of Deep
Underground77 states that the use of deep underground space which provides
a public benefit does not violate the right of the private surface owner. The
deep underground is defined as the depth of the basement of a building and the
underground that is not normally used for construction or such depth as
specified by a Cabinet Order. There are procedures established to obtain a
licence from the Minister of Land to use the underground space, and
compensation arrangements for and disturbance of surface use, but a strong
priority on the public benefit rather than the private rights.
In Germany, the Civil Code does not limit the extent of ownership, but it
stipulates that
[t]he right of the owner of a plot of land extends to the space above the surface and
to the subsoil under the surface. However, the owner may not prohibit influences
that are exercised at such a height or depth that he has no interest in excluding
them.78
The German model does not exclude ‘ownership’ of the subsurface, it merely
excludes the right to exclusive possession at a depth. However, the lack of a
specified depth could raise difficulty in determining the precise area over
which the owner has authority.79
In the UK, the Infrastructure Act 2015 created a right to use deep level
land — at least 300 m below the surface — for exploiting petroleum or
geothermal energy.80 In other words, such access and use was not a trespass
upon the surface owner.
76 Ibid s 44. See also Elaine Chew, ‘Digging Deep into the Ownership of Underground
Space — Recent Changes in Respect of Subterranean Land Use’ (March 2017) Singapore
Journal of Legal Studies 1.
77 Act on Special Measures Concerning Public Use of Deep Underground (Japan) Act No 87
of 2000.
78 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] (Germany) §905 [Restriction of ownership]. For
other examples of civil code prescriptions of vertical rights see Stuart S Ball, ‘The Vertical
Extent of Ownership in Land’ (1928) 76(6) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 631,
682.
79 Not specifying a depth also provides flexibility so the law does not impede technological
advancement or innovative subterranean land uses.
80 Infrastructure Act 2015 (UK) s 43.
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In New Zealand, just as statutes have provided for public ownership of
riverbeds, seabed, and airspace, it seems well within the authority of the
Crown to declare, by appropriate declaratory or confiscatory legislation,81
deeper subsurface space as public. This would certainly ease the current
impediments to constructing subsurface infrastructure, and arguably would
have no practical impact on private property.
IX Discussion
Property is a vital institution in society that should not be meddled with
unnecessarily. Property law should provide clarity, security and certainty
about what rights can be claimed. But property is there to serve society, not
vice versa, and it must change and adapt as society changes. Many
commentators remind us that property is not a fixed and unyielding institution
of inviolate and archaic rules, but is flexible and responsive to new social,
demographic, technological and environmental conditions.82
In 1926, the US Supreme Court stated:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with the great increase
and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are
developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in
respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities.83
Kevin Gray and Susan Gray have stated that, on one view:
‘Property’ no longer articulates the arrogance of entitlement, but expresses instead
the commonality of obligation ... Today the concept of ‘property’ in land may well
denote no more than a temporarily licenced form of utility or user-privilege which
may be extended, varied or withdrawn at the sole discretion of the state and on terms
dictated by it.84
The state must act in the public interest, and it is clear that the state (at least
in New Zealand, with no overriding constitution) has the freedom and
responsibility to change — or clarify85 — property law in the public interest.
It is not in the public interest for surface proprietors to impede subsurface uses
or seek compensation for lost property which is physically beyond any
reasonable use.
Griffiths J in Bernstein said: ‘The problem ... is to balance the rights of an
owner to enjoy the use of his land against the rights of the general public to
take advantage of all that science now offers in the use of airspace.’86 The
same should be said of subsurface space. It is a very reasonable assumption
that most property owners have no interest in what happens in even relatively
81 In much the same way that the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 does
for the foreshore and seabed.
82 Professor Eric Freyfogle has written extensively about the need for property law to shift in
favour of public rights. See, eg, Eric T Freyfogle, The Land We Share: Private Property and
the Common Good (Island Press, 2003).
83 Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Company 272 US 365 (1926), 386.
84 Gray and Gray (n 3).
85 This will depend on whether the brocard is accepted as part of New Zealand common law
or not.
86 Bernstein (n 19) [4].
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shallow subsurface (eg beyond 15 m deep), and any activities undertaken
there (like tunnelling for a roadway) will not affect the ‘ordinary use and
enjoyment’ of their land.
In New Zealand, the Crown has legislated to protect Crown interests in the
seabed, navigable rivers, and the upper airspace. It is time the Crown similarly
legislated for Crown interests in subsurface space beyond a normally
accessible depth. The Singapore legislation sets a fine example although the
more rugged New Zealand topography would mean that an absolute datum
depth would not work; a surface-relative depth would. Alternatively,
project-specific legislation could provide for specific infrastructure projects to
proceed without the unnecessary complications and costs of negotiating and
compensating unaffected surface owners.87
In view of how the idea of res communis has been recognised in New
Zealand legislation88 previously, the idea that subsurface rights beyond a
reasonable depth are common to all could readily be applied. Creating a
subsurface Crown stratum could also work, although that still assumes that
deep subsurface space can be owned, albeit by the Crown. The vertical
subdivision of land into fee simple parcels, especially creating deep
non-contiguous parcels with limitless depth, serves no constructive purpose.
In the same way that the skies are open for public navigation, subsurface
space beyond the reasonable depth required for normal surface users should be
considered as public space and made available for public use and navigation.
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